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Amid the dense forest and 120 villages that spread across the Rayagada and 
Kalahandi districts of the Niyamgiri Hills in southwestern Odisha, India, reside 
the 10,000 members of the Dongria Kondh. They are a small community of 
horticultural mountain dwellers who hold sacred the mountain and its deity, 
Niyam Raja (“the giver of law”).1 They inhabit a 250-square kilometer area 
known for its unadulterated landscapes and pure streams.2 They are an ancient 
people, and references to them appear in the Hindu myths and classics, notably 
the Purānas (Sanskrit: पुराण).3 The Indian government regards them as one of 
the country’s few Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups.4 They refer to 
themselves as Jharma, the protectors of the stream.5 
 
 
*Christopher Rossi teaches international law at the University of Iowa Law College. 
1 Kundan Kumar, The Sacred Mountain: Confronting Global Capital at Niyamgiri, 54 GEOFORUM 196, 
196 (2014). 
2 MEENAL TATPATI ET AL., THE NIYAMGIRI STORY: CHALLENGING THE IDEA OF GROWTH WITHOUT 
LIMITS? 5 (2016). 
3 Sanjeeta Kumari Devi, Socio-Economic Status of the Dongria Kondhs: A Primitive Tribal Group of 
Niyamgiri Hillis in Eastern Ghats of Orissa, 2 INT’L J. RSCH. 60, 63 (2016). 
4 Gandham Bulliyya, Ethnographic and Health Profile of the Dongria Kondh: A Primitive Tribal Group 
of Niyamgiri Hills in Eastern Ghats of Orissa, 1 AFRO ASIAN J. ANTHROPOLOGY & SOC. POL’Y 11, 
15 (2010).  India has over 700 official (“scheduled”) tribes and the largest number (sixty-two) inhabit 
Odisha (formerly Orissa). National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 
https://ncst.gov.in/content/frequently-asked-questions.  In addition to the Dongria Kondh, Orissa has 
twelve other Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (formerly called Primitive Tribal Groups), the 
highest number in India. See Other Information Relating to Tribals: Name of Particularly Vulnerable 
Tribal Groups (PTGS) (Earlier Called as Primitive Tribal Groups, https://ncst.gov.in/content/other-
information-relating-tribals (last visited Dec. 9, 2020). 
5 See Anurag Mallick & Priya Ganapathy, The Tribes of Odisha, OUTLOOK TRAVELLER (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.outlookindia.com/traveller/ot-getaway-guides/the-tribes-of-odisha/ (noting their name is 
derived from “dongar,” meaning “mountain;” however, they refer to themselves as Jharnia, meaning 
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In 2003, a legal controversy arose when the London-based conglomerate 
Vedanta Aluminum Limited signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Odisha officials to construct an alumina refinery at the mountain’s base.6 The 
plan included an open-pit, three million ton per annum, bauxite mining operation 
atop the sacred mountain and a seventy-five megawatt coal-based power plant 
to smelt the ore.7 India is one of the world’s leading bauxite producers, and the 
state of Odisha is India’s leading producer of this ore.8 Bauxite is the principal 
ore of aluminum and is one of the world’s most important non-ferrous metals.9 
It is intensively used throughout modern industry.10 
On April 18, 2013, the Supreme Court of India rendered judgment in a 
contentious land use case, which has obvious environmental and human rights 
implications.11 A lower court concluded that the construction work undertaken 
by the petitioner began “without obtaining environmental clearance,” violating 
environment impact assessment notification provisions of India’s Environment 
(Protection) Act.12 The Supreme Court affirmed the finding13 and prevented the 
corporation from mining bauxite.14 Its judgment also focused on the rights of 
indigenous peoples (“Scheduled Tribes”) and “Traditional Forest Dwellers.” 
Reviewing constitutional definitions of such peoples,15 the Court recognized 
their “very old” and “well defined” status,16 agrarian livelihood,17 and “great 
emotional attachments to their lands.”18 The Court observed that “[l]and is their 
most important natural and valuable asset and imperishable endowment from 
which the tribal derive their sustenance, social status, economic and social 
equality, permanent place of abode, work and living.”19 The Court held that the 
relevant statute in question, India’s Forest Rights Act (2006), did not merely 
pertain to property rights or areas of habitation; it widened to include social 
welfare provisions that protected the customary rights of forest dwellers “to use 
forest land as a community forest resource.”20 
 
 
6 Anjali George, Claiming Niyamgiri: The Dongria Kondh’s Struggle Against Vedanta, RITIMO (Dec. 18, 
2014), https://www.ritimo.org/Claiming-Niyamgiri-the-Dongria-Kondh-s-Struggle-against-Vedanta. 
7 Id. (recounting the tribe’s dispute with the mining company). 
8Bauxite, INDIAN MINERALS YEARBOOK 2017 3-2, 3-10 (56th ed. 2018),  
https://ibm.gov.in/writereaddata/files/06262018131044Bauxite(AR)2017.pdf. For general information, 
see National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, https://ncst.nic.in/. 
9 Hobart M. King, Bauxite, GEOLOGY.COM (2020), https://geology.com/minerals/bauxite.shtml 
(discussing bauxite, its composition and properties, and industrial uses). 
10 Id. 
11 Orissa Mining Corp. Ltd. v. Ministry of Env’t & Forest & Others, (2013) W.P.(C) No. 180/2011 
(India), available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/153831190/ [hereinafter Orissa Mining]. For a report 
on the environmental impact of the mining operation produced by India’s Central Empowered 
committee, which reports to the Indian Supreme Court to monitor regulations on hazardous waste and 
complaints about environmental waste, see CENTRAL EMPOWERED COMMITTEE, REPORT IN IA NO. 
1324 REGARDING THE ALUMINA REFINERY PLANT BEING SET UP BY M/S VENDANTA ALUMINA 
LIMITED AT LANJIGARH IN KALAHANDI DISTRICT, ORISSA, (Sept. 21, 2005),  
http://www.indiaresource.org/issues/globalization/2005/CECSep2005cancellicense.html. 
12 See Orissa Mining, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 2, 11, 43. 
13 Id. at ¶ 30.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at ¶ 31 (discussing arts. 366(25) and 342 of the Indian Constitution). 
16 Id. ¶ 49 (iii) (d). 
17 Id. ¶ 33. 
18 See Orissa Mining, supra note 11, at ¶ 33 
19 Id. 
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 The Court remanded the case to the State of Orissa to place the bauxite 
mining project before the Gram Sabhas,21 or surrounding village assemblies, to 
determine if the project, “in any way, affects their religious [and cultural] rights 
. . . in the hills top of the Niyamgiri range.”22 Within three months, all 12 Gram 
Sabhas had voted against the mining project, foreclosing Vedanta’s bauxite 
mining plans atop Niyamgiri Mountain, sparking David and Goliath 
comparisons23 and vindicating the Dongria Kondh in their decade-long dispute 
with global capitalism. 
Their cause attracted world-wide attention and support.24 Amnesty 
International hailed the decision as a “landmark victory” recognizing indigenous 
rights in India.25 Norway’s trillion-dollar Government Pension Fund26 excluded 
Vedanta as an investment option “due to unacceptable risk of complicity” 
involving “environmental damage and systemic human rights violations.”27 The 
Church of England divested holdings in the company following complaints to 
the British government under the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development guidelines for multinational companies.28 
The international and comparative legal implications of this dispute may be 
hard to extrapolate from Indian constitutional law, which embraces a variant of 
federalism that is based on asymmetric relationships.29 The dynamics of India’s 
 
 
21 See id. ¶¶ 58–63. 
22 Id. ¶ 58.  For reference to consideration of cultural claims, see id. ¶ 59.  
23 Sophie Boehm & Carole Excell, The Man Who Stopped the Mine. Q&A with Prafulla Samantara, 
2017 Goldman Environmental Prize Winner, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/man-who-stopped-mine-qa-prafulla-samantara-2017-goldman-
environmental-prize-winner (referencing the comparison to the battle between David and Goliath). 
24 See Samantha Balaton-Chrimes, Desiring the Other and Decolonizing Global Solidarity: Time with 
and Space in the Anti-Vedanta Campaign, 10 HUMANITY J. 239, 239 (Aug. 3, 2019), (assessing Survival 
Internationals’ worldwide campaign to support the Dongria Kondh struggle to prevent the 
conglomerate from acquiring their sacred mountain); Kumar, supra note 1, at 202 (charting the key 
actors, activists, and organizations aligned to assist the Niyamgiri struggle).  
25 India: Landmark Supreme Court Ruling a Great Victory for Indigenous Rights, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 
18, 2013), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/04/india-landmark-supreme-court-ruling-
great-victory-indigenous-rights/. 
26 NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MGMT., https://www.nbim.no/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2020). The fund was 
established in 1969 to manage the wealth benefits of revenue generated by Norway’s oil and gas 
resources and is currently valued at more than $1.12 trillion (10,000 billion kroner).  
27 COUNCIL OF ETHICS, GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, RECOMMENDATION OF MAY 15, 2007 
38–39 (2007), 
https://www.banktrack.org/download/recommendations_on_vedanta/recommendation_vedanta.pdf. 
28 See Jo Woodman, India’s Rejection of Vedanta’s Bauxite Mine is a Victory for Tribal Rights, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2014/jan/14/india-rejection-vedanta-mine-victory-tribal-rights (discussing the precedential 
value and effects of the landmark decision). 
29 In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC (Jour) 1, ¶ 15, India’s Supreme Court recognized the 
United States as a model for federal structure. However, Article 3 of India’s Constitution allowed for 
asymmetries between the Union and its respective states due to circumstances substantially different 
“from the federal set-up established in the [U.S.]” Id. at ¶ 16. “‘Asymmetric federalism’ is understood 
to mean federalism based on unequal powers and relationships in political, administrative and fiscal 
arrangements spheres between the units constituting [India’s] federation.” M. Govinda Rao & Nirvikar 
Singh, Asymmetric Federalism in India 2–3 (U.C. Santa Cruz Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 04-08, 
2004). On the importance of asymmetric federalism as a tool for societal coherence in India, see Louise 
Tillin, United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism, 31 J. FEDERALISM 45 (2006). India’s 
sudden repeal of Art. 370 in August 2019 in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir has sparked a 
keen constitutional debate. For general background on Jammu and Kashmir’s former special 
(asymmetric) status, see Sonia Dasgupta, Article 370: An Example of Asymmetrical Federalism?, 11 
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internal or domestic complexity, not international law itself, engineered this 
decision. However, questions of transnational resource management, neoliberal 
economics, globalization, human rights, and domestic and international social 
mobilization dynamics—all questions involving international law—pervaded 
the case and intersected with the proceedings. 
While problems of transnational globalization focus much attention on the 
emerging rights of indigenous peoples, this conversation also implicates 
neoliberalism and its market-based influences on development economics, 
extraction politics, and emerging economies.30 The incorporation of indigenous 
protections may result in a dramatic restructuring of international law. The 2007 
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples indicates 
this movement is underway.31 However, such restructuration has been described 
as “explosive” given “the ever-expanding economic role of transnational 
enterprises as part of the emergence of global capitalism.”32 
James Anaya, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, recognized “[t]he growing awareness of the actual or 
potential negative impact of industry operations on the rights of indigenous 
peoples.” However, he labeled “natural resource extraction and other 
development projects on or near indigenous territories . . . [as] possibly the most 
pervasive source of the challenges to the full exercise of their rights.”33 
Embedded in these tensions is international law’s collision course with the 
question of place. 
This article recognizes the often-discussed neoliberal implications of 
transglobalism. However, it focuses on the lesser considered place-based factor 
that affects international law’s construction. The diminishment of human spatial 
geography in the development of international law continues to weigh down the 
expression of human and indigenous rights, overshadowed as it often is by 
extraction politics. 
The place-based rise of challenges to exploitative resource development 
suggests an important, interactive turn in the sociological development of 
international law, a turn increasingly associated with international law’s spatial 
construction. The Dongria Kondh campaign represents an emblematic 
grassroots resistance movement that stretches across the transnational resource-
extraction map. As dramatic as the Dongria Kondh’s victory may have been, its 
world-wide impact remains in question. Domestic and international legal 
systems currently confront numerous conflicts involving extraction politics, land 
use issues, and indigenous rights.34 Notable struggles include Kalinga and 
 
 
30 See generally THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT 
COLLECTIVE (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009) (presenting essays on salon-styled 
neoliberal outgrowth of the Mont Pèlerin Society and the voluntarist advantages of open society as 
opposed to statist versions of interventionism). 
31 See G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (2007), https://undocs.org/A/RES/61/295 
(recognizing, inter alia, “the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous 
peoples . . . especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources”). 
32 Joshua Kleinfeld, The Double Life of International Law: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive 
Industries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2016).  
33 James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Extractive Industries 
Operating Within or Near Indigenous Territories, ¶ 55–56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35 (July 11, 2011).  
34 Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Aust.), 1992 I.C.J. REP. 240 
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Bontok protests against the Chico River Basin Development Project in the 
Philippines, Wet’suwet’en responses to the tar sands and gas pipelines project 
in British Columbia, Guarani resistance to commercial plantations in Brazil, 
Wajan and Jagalingou efforts to prevent coal mining in Australia,35 Mapuche 
resistance to water diversion projects in Chile,36 Queche struggles against 
mineral extraction in the Andean Cone,37 the confederated Native opposition to 
the Dakota Access Pipeline across burial grounds of the Standing Rock Sioux 
Nation,38 and the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s protest declaration against the 
Ilulissat signatories’ self-professed stewardship of Arctic terrain and waters.39  
These samplings of the domestic and transnational consequences of Native 
movements highlight a growing awareness of indigenous rights as a prominent, 
relatively recent resistance movement in international law,40 and the growing 
normative and conventional legal emphasis on place-based peoples.41 These 
samplings also evidence the continuing challenges to the idea of place, or what 
the humanities describes as a sense of place.  
This article investigates the persistence of this problem. It argues that 
international law’s organization of nineteenth century space informs the 
 
 
and principles of self-determination based on environmental damage claims brought by the Republic 
of Nauru against Australian phosphate extraction). The parties later reached a settlement and 
discontinued the proceedings. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Aust.), 1993 I.C.J. Rep. 
322, 322–23 (Discontinuance Order of Sept. 13, 1993). For a discussion linking the Nauruan claim to 
indigenous rights, see Antony Anghie, “The Heart of My Home”: Colonialism, Environmental 
Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 445, 485–90 (1993). 
35 See Tattpati, supra note 2, at 2.  
36 See Diane Haughney, Defending Territory, Demanding Participation: Mapuche Struggles in Chile, 
39 LAT. AM. PERSP. 201, 207–10 (2012) (discussing the indigenous people’s campaigns against 
conglomerate hydroelectric projects). 
37 See Helle Abelvik-Lawson, Indigenous Environmental Rights, Participation and Lithium Mining in 
Argentina and Bolivia: A Socio-Legal Analysis 35 (May 2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Essex). 
38 Amber Penn-Roco, Standing Rock and the Erosion of Tribal Rights, 73 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 176, 
176 (2016) (involving more than 100 tribes). 
39 Art. 2 (2.6), A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, Apr. 2009, available at 
https://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Signed-Inuit-Sovereignty-Declaration-
11x17.pdf. (accusing the five coastal Arctic states—Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Canada, U.S., and 
Russia—with negligence).  See also Sophie Theriault, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland:  Inuit 
People’s Food Security in the Age of Climate Change and Arctic Melting, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 223, 243 
n.90 and accompanying text (discussing the meeting in Nunavik leading up to the Declaration). 
40 Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law Over the Last 10 Years and Future 
Developments, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 27, 27 (2009). On the acceleration of indigenous rights issues 
beginning in the 1970s, see Adolfo de Oliveira, Introduction: Decolonising Approaches to Indigenous 
Rights, in DECOLONISING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 1, 3 (Adolfo de Oliveira ed. 2009); Peter Jull, The 
Politics of Sustainable Development, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT & GLOBAL 
RIGHTS 21, 25–7 (Svein Jentoft et al., eds. 2003) (discussing the rise of indigenous internationalism 
beginning in 1973);  Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A 
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 414, 414 (1998) (noting the 
transformative significance of “indigenous peoples” since the early 1970s); BRADLEY REED HOWARD, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE STATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIVE RIGHTS 95 (2003) (discussing the 
early 1970s separation of the category of “indigenous populations” from that of “minorities”); Hurst 
Hannum, New Development in Indigenous Rights, 28 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 649, 649–50 (1988) 
(discussing more aggressive assertions of indigenous rights in the 1980s). 
41 See U.N. Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 
(Sept. 13, 2007); International Labour Organization Convention (No. 169), Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 28, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383, entered into force 
Sept. 5, 1991 (revising ILO Convention 107 on Indigenous ad Tribal Populations); U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/51/78 (Feb. 25, 1997) (deciding to include activities agenda establishing the International 
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discussion. During this period, international law developed under the sway of 
geographic emphases that conformed to a Eurocentric mindset of entitlement 
and formalistic rulemaking. These emphases differed from the pragmatic 
polycentric regional legal landscapes that preceded the rise of European 
dominance,42 and even paradigmatic Augustinian notions of peace that extended 
to the end of the eighteenth century.43 
 Colonialism catalyzed international law’s nineteenth and early twentieth 
century universalization, which established a “right to rule” in conformity with 
the unclear yet strongly asserted droit public de l’Europe and the ius publicum 
europaeum.44 The effects of this historical encounter did not end with 
decolonization, projecting instead its widening gyre to the formerly colonized 
newborn republics.45 A “post-colonial paradox—guised as a “Greek Gift”—
arose in relation to hemispheric spatial organization with the acceptance of 
formalistic law. The price paid by newborn republics for independence carried 
with it the costs and schematics of a public international law that European 
powers almost exclusively shaped as the makers of colonialism.46 
This legacy continues to constrain international law and its interplay with 
domestic legal systems. The highlands of the Niyamgiri Hills in India seem 
remotely connected to the demise of metropolitan rule in the Americas, except 
in consideration of the development of legal formalism, remnants of which 
impede a fuller embrace of indigenous rights everywhere in international law. 
This article contends that legal formalism helps to explain why the 
incorporation of human geography and place-based considerations into 
international law have been so difficult to achieve. Identifying legal formalism’s 
key role, while avoiding its treatment as “a heresy driven underground” by the 
“derogatory comments of its detractors,”47 clarifies difficulties affecting 
developments in international law. The question of place and its relation to 
international law extends beyond the ambit of indigenous rights. It pervades the 
study and application of international law generally. Addressing this question 
helps to explain international law’s dismissive encounter with the idea of 
topophilia—the human sense (love) of place that undergirds much controversy 
involving self-determination and indigenous rights.48 The argument here is that 
legal formalism and its nineteenth century rise helped to construct the 
imaginaries of America’s frontier expansion and its union with international 
law’s “civilizing influence.” 
 
 
42 Jörn Axel Kämmerer, Introduction. Imprints of Colonialism in Public International Law: On the 
Paradoxes of Transition, 18 J. HIST. INT’L L. 239, 241–42 (2016). 
43 See HARALD KLEINSCHMIDT, DISKRIMINIERUNG DURCH VERTRAG UND KRIEG: 
ZWISCHENSTAATLICHE VERTRÄGE UND DER BEGRIFF DES KOLONIALKRIEGS IM 19. UND FRÜHEN 20. 
JAHRHUNDERT 20 (2013). 
44 Id. at 240. 
45 See id. at 243–44 (discussing the formerly colonized shift toward discriminatory rule-making based 
on the Euro-suppression of non-European trans-communitarian rule-making). 
46 Id. at 240. 
47 Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950 
(1988). 
48 Humanist geographer Yi-Fu Tuan popularized the term to complicate geography’s unwitting 
orientation toward topography and physical locale. See generally YI-FU TUAN, TOPOPHILIA: A STUDY 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTIONS, ATTITUDES, AND VALUES (1990); see also YI-FU TUAN, SPACE 
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Formalism in the United States is often presented as a post-Civil War 
movement.49 While this article picks up on this theme, which resulted in a major 
twentieth century confrontation with legal realism, it also traces formalism’s 
antecedents to early nineteenth century judicial and political encounters with 
slavery and Indian removal. The early American Republic’s ambivalent, if not 
contradictory, treatment of these inherent problems helped to construct 
formalism’s pathway into international law, which conceptualized an 
international notion of place and space that emphasized sovereign rights and 
dominium at the expense of indigenous rights.  
Where did legal formalism come from and how did it cross over into 
international law to diminish the significance of human geography and the rights 
of indigenous peoples? Addressing these questions uncovers a significantly 
American story. 
Part II of this article traces the genealogy of formalism, highlighting its 
development from teachings of German historicism and legal science. Although 
subject to a variety of usages and definitions, formalism emphasized 
immanence—the elaboration of legal principles from within the self-contained 
domain of judicial reasoning. Part II also connects the rise of formalism to the 
maturation of American common law, the professionalization of legal teaching 
and practice, the doctrinal development of an American approach to 
international law, and connections to parallel movements in European 
international law in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Part III holds that 
the difficulty with formalism’s judicial application in the United States began 
much earlier in the nineteenth century than is commonly thought. Questions 
relating to ending the international slave trade and Indian removal exposed 
unreconcilable tensions with republican virtue while simultaneously shaping the 
country’s ambivalent orientation to its internal and expanding frontier and its 
widening encounter with international legal order. Part IV concludes this 
discussion by suggesting that formalism’s incomplete treatment of spatiality and 
place nevertheless crossed over into the corpus of modern international law and 
continues to challenge the expression of indigenous rights and the spatial order 
in this current age of neoliberalism and transglobal resource extraction. Under 
such circumstances, the fuller expression of human rights and indigenous rights 
are likely to be forestalled until international law completes its turn to address 
questions of spatiality and place.   
 
 
II. THE RISE OF FORMALISM 
 
Formalism has been described as an unwieldy legal idiom with “so many 
meanings and valences” as to make it an “all purpose” term of “approbation and 
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of disapprobation.”50 Although often defined by its critics,51 advocates also 
agree that formalism emphasizes the rational deducibility of law.52 Its genealogy 
generally traces to the development of mid-nineteenth century German legal 
science, principally from Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), Karl von 
Gareis (1844-1923),53 and the German historical school.54 German historicism 
attached meaning and context to the situatedness of law. Its adherents, called 
Pandectists, drew inspiration from the Pandects of Justinian’s Digest, which 
emphasized law’s self-contained completeness. They focused legal method on 
the deducibility of an applicable legal principle from an examination of the 
footprints internal to the development of place-based customs and practices, 
which only the study of history could reveal.55 Its greatest English language 
expositor, Sir Henry Maine (1822-1888), understood legal formalism to be a 
progressive, depersonalized, and liberating evolutionary path that broke the 
chains of established status relationships and forged new links to voluntary 
contractual accords.56 This de-linking and re-forging process, in Weberian 
terms, facilitated the projection of law as an instrument of logical formal 
rationality—emphasizing proprietary ownership over interpersonal status 
relationships, which had an overriding impact on Native and non-Native 
connections to land and place.57  
Max Weber’s (1864-1920) description of formalism captured its essential 
elements: 
 
first, that every concrete legal decision be the “application” of 
an abstract legal proposition to a concrete “fact situation”; 
second, that it must be possible in every concrete case to derive 
the decision from abstract legal propositions by means of legal 
logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a 
“gapless” system of legal propositions, or must, at least, be 
treated as if it were such a gapless system; fourth, that 
whatever cannot be “construed” rationally in legal terms is also 
 
 
50 Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 180 (1986-1987). See also Philip Allott, Comments on 
Jean D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment 
of Legal Rules, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.ejiltalk.org/comments-on-jean-daspremont-
formalism-and-the-sources-of-international-law-a-theory-of-the-ascertainment-of-legal-rules/ 
(suggesting the word is so entangled in many different theoretical disputes that it might be better to 
avoid its usage). 
51 Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57, 58 
(2003). 
52 Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 11 (2010) 
(noting formalism’s reliance on syllogistic reasoning, as well). 
53 INSTITUTIONEN DES VÖLKERRECHTS (1888); KARL GAREIS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW: 
SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF THE LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL STUDY (Albert Kocourek trans. 1911) 
(1921). 
54 F. VON SAVIGNY, POSSESSION (Perry Erskine trans., 6th ed. 1848). Hermann Kantorowicz identified 
Savigny’s Über den Feruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814) as the 
“starting point” of the German historical school. Hermann Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical 
School of Law, 53 L. Q. REV. 326, 332 (1937).   
55 Yosef Lindell, A Science like any Other? Classical Legal Formalism in the Halakhic Jurisprudence 
of Rabbis Isaac Jacob Reines and Moses Avigdor Amiel, 28 J. L. & RELIGION 179, 181 (2012). 
56 Henry Sumner Maine, From Status to Contract, in ANCIENT LAW (1861) (showing the evolutionary 
path of historical legal development that famously introduced Maine). 
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legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of human 
beings must always be visualized as either an “application” or 
“execution” of legal propositions, or as an “infringement” 
thereof, since the “gaplessness” of the legal system must result 
in a gapless “legal ordering” of all social conduct.58 
 
Weber distinguished the systemic rationalization of legal formalism in civil 
law countries from the piecemeal, judge-made, writ-based historical 
development of the common law. The development of “legal science,” as 
discussed in late nineteenth-century American law schools, never could 
structurally embrace the systematic developments of “legal science” as liberally 
borrowed from continental, particularly German, legal discourse.59 Gaps 
appeared, although somewhat earlier than common doctrinal presentations 
admit. These gaps represented stress fractures in the application of formalist 
principles given the contradictory interface between American republican virtue 
and the originary problems of chattel slavery and how to deal with indigenous 
peoples. 
Whether influenced by common or civil law, historicists nevertheless 
distinguished themselves from natural law advocates, whom historicists claimed 
applied rational principles of justice and morality through speculative sources 
external to law. Formalists would adapt German historicist influences; however, 
they would reorient law’s deducibility away from the abstract touchstone of 
morality and toward law’s internal self-sufficiency as uncovered by judges. An 
economic offshoot of their legal school broadened formalism’s appeal and 
penetrated America in the 1870s and 1880s through the teachings of German-
trained economists, who emphasized the historical power of place-based 
statistics to inform industrial and commercial policy.60 
Former judge and University of Chicago law scholar Richard Posner 
described legal formalism as the theory that “once lawmakers produce rules, 
judges should apply them to the facts of a case without regard to social interests 
and public policy.”61 Legal philosopher David Lyons labeled formalism as an 
expression of the sufficiency of law as a means for deciding any case that arises: 
“There are no ‘gaps’ within the law, and there is but one sound legal decision 
for each case. The law is complete and univocal.”62 This is the “fixed and final 
form” Roscoe Pound influentially criticized as the expression of “mechanical 
 
 
58 Id. at 657–58. 
59 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 
26 (2009). 
60 Joseph Dorfman, The Role of the German Historical School in American Economic Thought, 45 AM. 
ECON. REV. 17, 1717 (1955); Panayotis G. Michaelides & John G. Milos, Joseph Schumpeter and the 
German Historical School, 33 J. ECON. 495, 507 (2009) (discussing key elements of Schumpeter’s 
relation to the German historical school, including the construction of economics as a social science 
based in part on economic statics). For an argument on the heterodoxy of the movement, making it 
neither German nor historical, see Heath Pearson, Was There Really a German Historical School of 
Economics?, HIST. POL. ECON. 547, 547–62 (1999). 
61 RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 4–5 (2013). 
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jurisprudence,” where the rules were as fixed as Procrustes’ iron bed,63 and the 
“cases were to be fitted [mechanically shortened or stretched] to the rules.”64 
Pound’s critique, along with many foes of the formalist period, attacked the 
“rigidly doctrinaire” style of syllogistic reasoning that misapplied abstract first 
principles to produce socially unacceptable results.65 
Legal philosopher Ernest Weinrib referred to this hallmark gap-avoiding 
attribute of formalism as immanence. “By suggesting that the rationality of law 
lies in a moral order immanent to legal material,” Weinrib held that formalism 
presented a self-contained internalist dimension—a provenance of plenitude or 
immanent moral rationality—where “juridical content can somehow sustain 
itself from within,”66 where “law has a content that is not imported from without 
but elaborated from within.”67 Therefore, the art of legal creativity actually 
restricted law ascertainment to a process of discovery, “most naturally expressed 
in adjudication,” through the internal application of pre-existing rules or 
principles to an emergent or ever-changing fact pattern.68 This understanding of 
formalism—as a conscious form of rule application employed from normative 
principles internal to law—naturally emphasized the judicial process and the role 
of the judge.69 Immanence promoted self-contained thinking, an “anglophone 
conception of law . . . tied into a sense of community values that could be 
objectively identified,”70 where answers arose from unassuming connections to 
conquest and expansion, not from external considerations related to displaced 
human geography.  
 
A. FORMALISM’S FERTILE GROUND 
 
Formalism found fertile ground in the United States after the American Civil 
War and “rose to its zenith at the turn of the century,”71 roughly the same period 
that the European profession of international law began to take shape. American 
common law’s reliance on the “unique” role of judges (“generic to the whole 
western world”) and the capitalist form of business enterprise also began to 
converge.72 This braiding of institutions facilitated formalism’s domestic and 
international interface, while contributing to ending the “explosive 
 
 
63 In Greek mythology, Procrustes resolved tensions of life by stretching or shortening the customer to 
perfectly fit suit (metaphorically cast as an iron bed), never pausing to consider the possibility of 
tailoring the suit to fit the customer. See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BED OF 
PROCRUSTES: PHILOSOPHICAL AND PRACTICAL APHORISMS xi—xii (2016). 
64 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607 (1908). 
65 Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM J. LEG. HIST. 221, 221–22 (1980). 
66 Weinrib, supra note 47, at 955. 
67 Id. at 956. 
68 Id. 
69 See William E. Nelson, Judge Weinfeld and the Adjudicatory Process: A Law Finder in an Age of 
Judicial Lawmakers, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 982 (1975) (discussing “fact judge,” Judge Edward 
Weinfeld, and the formalist application of law). 
70 PAUL MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL SOCIETIES AND THE COMMON LAW: A HISTORY OF SOVEREIGNTY, 
STATES, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 30 (2004). 
71 Goetsch, supra note 65, at 221. For contemporary depictions of the classical formalists, see, e.g., 
Duxbury, supra note 49, at 9; GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND 
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 13–33 (1995); ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM 
AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 136–59 (1982). 
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contradictions” of plantation agrarianism and industrial capitalism’s coexistence 
in one country.73 
During this period, if not slightly before, a market-oriented transformation 
in American law also began to separate the common law from its previous 
concerns for the “substantive fairness of economic exchange;” American 
common law became “facilitative of individual desires” and reflective of 
economic and political power.74 Land hunger already had motivated the drive to 
establish frontier settlements over the Appalachian Mountains, in violation of 
England’s Royal Proclamation (1763) prohibiting colonists’ land-grabbing 
migration over the range.75 Claims to land appropriation, fueled by a burgeoning 
sense of Manifest Destiny, followed with the passage of the Northwest 
Ordinance (1787),76 the Louisiana Purchase (1803),77 the acquisition of West,78 
then Spanish Florida (1819),79 the state-based, then federally-supported 
domination of the Native southeast and the removal the so-called Five Civilized 
Tribes (1830),80 the secession and annexation of Tejas (Texas, 1836; 1845),81 
the takeover of the Spanish southwest in the Mexican-American War (1846-
1848),82 and the westward movement into Oregon Territory (1850).83 
Historian Greg Grandin metaphorically viewed this westward expansion as 
the “gate of escape,” the ever-expanding spatial portal deployed by the newborn, 
racially conflicted country to dominate land while forestalling confrontation 
with the contradictions of its own republican mythos.84 By the end of the 
nineteenth century, historian Frederick Jackson Turner had located fully-formed 
American virtues in this expansionary spatial domain. These virtues were not 
inherited from European forbearers, they were bequeathed from internal, rugged, 
pragmatic, individualistic encounters with spatial engagements on the expanding 
 
 
73 Jason W. Moore, Remaking Work, Remaking Space: Spaces of Production and Accumulation in the 
Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1865–1920, 34 ANTIPODE 176, 177 (2002). 
74 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 253 (1977). 
75 See Royal Proclamation, 1763, INDIGENOUS FOUNDATIONS,  
https://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/royal_proclamation_1763/ (prohibiting colonial settlements 
west of the Appalachian Mountains, prohibiting molestation of Native Tribes and protecting traditional 
tribal hunting grounds. The Proclamation followed England’s defeat of France and its Native North 
American allies in the Seven Years War (1756–1763). 
76 See generally PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 
(2019) (discussing the Ordinance following its July 13, 1787 adoption in terms of a blueprint for an 
American empire of continental dimensions).  
77 See generally Louisiana Purchase: Primary Documents in American History, LIB. CONG. 
https://guides.loc.gov/louisiana-purchase/digital-collections (last visited Dec. 9, 2020) (showcasing 
seminal documents associated with territorial acquisition). 
78 See generally ISAAC JOSLIN COX, THE WEST FLORIDA CONTROVERSY, 1798–1813: A STUDY IN 
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1918) (discussing the thirty-seven year now-misnamed border dispute 
between Spain and the United States over control of the Apalachicola and Mississippi river outlets). 
79 Culminating in the Treaty of Adams-Onis (1819), 8 Stat. 252; TS 327; 11 Bevans 528; 3 Miller 3 
(1819), including the U.S. annexation of West Florida (1810, later becoming part of eastern Louisiana).  
80 See generally ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED 
TRIBES (1940) (presenting a leading historical account of the removal of the Five Civilized Tribes). 
81 See generally JUSTIN H. SMITH, THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS (1911) (presenting an acclaimed history 
of Texas). 
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83 Oregon Donation Land Act, 9 Stat. 496 (1850). 
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American frontier.85 They presented a unique and internal “American” rationale 
for spatial domination, which germinated seedlings of formalism. 
As the problematic international law theorist Carl Schmitt later framed the 
connection,86 the question of place inextricably connected soil (Boden) to law 
formation. In line with Lockean and Kantian conceptions of proprietary 
entitlement,87 the concurrent processes of land appropriation (Landnahme) 
worked by human hands, demarcated by engravements embedded in soil and 
land division, created the immediate means by which people made spatially 
visible their political and social order. The European act of cultivation and 
enclosure, clearing and planting, became important measures by which Native 
claims to place were denied.88 The perception of Natives’ nomadic way of life, 
which did not improve the land or make spatially visible their claim of 
dominium, contrasted with Jeffersonian Enlightenment philosophy and his 
Euclidean Public Land Survey System,89 Christianity’s civilizing mission, and 
biblical directive.90 
Schmitt attributed psychological qualities to this land cultivation, separating 
nihilistic and abstract normative threats to one’s spatial orientation from the 
concrete, personal attachments that grow out of law’s more properly nurtured, 
bounded space. “True law,” according to Schmitt, arose through the division and 
situation of space through telluric touchstones. In a word, he called it nomos.91 
If separated from this proper foundation, if adulterated by a distinctly political 
formulation, Schmitt forewarned of the hegemonic consequence of a Großraum, 
 
 
85 Frederick J. Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, 1893 (1894) (presenting the historiographically significant 
Frontier Thesis). 
86 Although noted for his brilliance and for an emerging wealth of attention to his theories, Schmitt was 
deplored as the Crown Jurist (Kronjurist) of the Third Reich. Ernst Jünger coined the moniker in 1943. 
Schmitt had joined the Nazi Party in 1933, and was detained, interrogated, and released by American 
authorities, who contemplated putting Schmitt in the docket at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. 
See generally REINHARD MEHRING, CARL SCHMITT: A BIOGRAPHY (Daniel Steuer trans., 2014) 
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Third Reich); JOSEPH J. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983) (affirming 
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87 See Christopher R. Rossi, The Nomos of Climate Change and the Sociological Refugee in a Sinking 
Century, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 613, 620–21 (2018) (comparing Schmittian, Lockean, and 
Kantian perspectives on land appropriation). 
88 The presidency of Andrew Jackson reflected this possessory claim as a defense for removing eastern 
Natives across the Mississippi River. See DAVID W. MILLER, THE TAKING OF AMERICAN INDIAN 
LANDS IN THE SOUTHEAST: A HISTORY OF TERRITORIAL CESSIONS AND FORCED RELOCATIONS, 1607-
1840, at 175 (2011) (quoting as an example Jackson’s War Secretary, Lewis Cass: “the Creator 
intended the earth should be reclaimed from a state of nature and cultivated; that . . . a tribe of 
wandering hunters . . . have a very imperfect possession of the country over which they roam.”). 
89 In 1785, Jefferson developed the Public Land Survey System, a land-based latticework which greatly 
facilitated the creation of a relentless grid to dispose of lands of the western territories. See 1785 - The 
Public Land Survey System (PLSS), American Period Maps, USGS 1, 4 (2017), 
https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/hornbeck_usa_1/23. 
90 See A. Whitney Griswold, The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson, 40 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657, 
661 (1946) (quoting Jefferson’s 1785 missive whereby he claimed “[t]he earth is given as a common 
stock to labour and live on”); STEVEN L. JAMES, NEW CREATION ESCHATOLOGY AND THE LAND: A 
SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 52 (2017) (noting ‘land’ and the “growing appreciation 
of territorial orientation” is the “fourth most frequent noun or substantive in the Old Testament”); 
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91 CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM 







2021  LEGAL FORMALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW’S SENSE OF PLACE 119 
which he specifically pinpointed in the form of the Monroe Doctrine and 
liberalism’s twentieth century pursuit of undifferentiated (raumlose) universal 
values. These values, according to Schmitt, became virulent; they metastasized 
the telluric and bounded mythos of Turner’s romanticized frontier thesis, 
spreading a new form of hegemony while destroying Schmitt’s equally 
cherished mythos of the bounded space he called the jus publicum Europaeum.92 
Critics of transglobalism regard Schmitt’s “multi-faceted political and spatial 
theories” as a polemic against technocratic capitalism, the displacement of 
indigenous peoples, and neoliberalism’s general abnegation of personhood. 93 
 
B. FORMALISM’S ALLIANCE WITH COMMON LAW AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM 
 
The development of American common law reflected the spatial bequeaths 
of frontier mentality and European heritage. In the mid-nineteenth century, an 
alliance between the legal profession and commercial interests overturned 
paternalistic and anti-development common law values. The rise of legal 
formalism helped to establish the supremacy of the right of contract. This 
offshoot of individualism transformed the public purpose doctrine, which 
limited government takings of private property for public use, and turned it into 
a commercially friendly adjunct of economic entrepreneurialism for the 
administration of public lands.94 It also promoted the politics and economics of 
land acquisition, as well, and large-scale Indian removal during the long 
nineteenth century.95   
Sixteenth-century Spain applied a remotely similar proto-corporatist form 
of legal entrepreneurialism—divisible sovereignty—to capture newfound 
wealth in the Americas and to spatially divide millions of hectares of territory 
described as terra ultra incognita.96 The empire’s political subdivisions, called 
viceroyalties, relied on a system of private capital to extract gold and silver 
through the issuance of land titles purchased by entrusted Spanish noblemen, 
called encomenderos. This charter system, which established a central royal 
authority-by-proxy system, was overseen by a judicial board, the Council of the 
Indies (1524). Hemispheric control would thereafter unveil in a series of 
subdivisions. These partitions vested legal authority and administrative control 
in the operations of captaincies-general, presidencies, judicial and 
 
 
92 Schmitt introduced the concept in a lecture before the Institute for Politics and international Law at 
the University of Kiel, weeks after the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia. See CARL SCHMITT, 
VÖLKERRECHTLICHE GROSSRAUMORDNUNG MIT INTERVENTIONSVERBOT FÜR RAUMFREMDE 
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translated as “great space,” Schmitt’s usage of Großraum more properly meant sphere of influence or 
geopolitical space. See Stuart Elden, Reading Schmitt Geopolitically: Nomos, Territory and Großraum, 
161 RADICAL PHILOSOPHY 18, 19 (2010). 
93 Rossi, supra note 87, at 630; see also id. at 631 (discussing how critics of transglobal capitalism read 
Schmitt). 
94 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM J. L. HIST. 251, 251 (1975). 
95 Robbie Ethridge, Reflections on the Long Nineteenth Century and Indian Removal, 17 AMERICAN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY HISTORY 241 (2016). The “long” nineteenth century, so described, began with 
the rumblings of Native removal, which could be heard in the late eighteenth century and which 
“stretched well into the late nineteenth century and beyond.” 
96 See Martin Waldseemüller, Universalis Cosmographia Secundum Ptholomaei Traditionem et Americi 
Vespucii Alioru[m]que Lustrationes, St. Dié, 1507, Geography & Map Reading Room, THE LIBRARY 
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administrative high courts (audiencias), and additional subunits, including rural 
districts, or corregimientos, magistrateships (alcaldías mayor), governorates 
(gobernaciónes), and subdelegaciones—all of which reflected imported Iberian 
hierarchical and socio-economic spatial arrangements that required classes of 
compradors, bureaucrats, and visitadors to administer.97 This “first step in the 
reconstruction of the Atlantic” and of the world98 facilitated the territorial 
division of the New World and provided the proto-contours of legal formalism 
that would take hold after the retreat of the metropolitan powers in the early 
nineteenth century. The influential anthropologist and Native American scholar, 
Edward Spicer, reduced this spatial reordering to the fundamental observation 
that the cycle of imperial conquest of the Americas repeatedly overrode Native 
belief systems. Natives never accepted the fungibility of land or the dissoluble 
nature of the “bond between themselves and the land.”99  
Native interests were not solely affected by this transition. According to 
American legal historian, Morton Horwitz, “[b]y the middle of the nineteenth 
century the legal system had been reshaped to the advantage of men of 
commerce and industry at the expense of farmers, workers, consumers, and other 
less powerful groups within the society . . . . The rise of legal formalism . . . fully 
correlated with the attainment of these substantive legal changes,”100 and its 
acceptance reoriented spatial conceptions of law’s domain.  
According to Horowitz, “[m]ost of the basic dichotomies in legal thought of 
the nineteenth century—between law and politics, law and morality, objective 
and subjective standards, distributional and allocation goals—arose to establish 
the objective nature of the market and to neutralize and hence defuse the political 
and redistributional potential of law.”101 Legal formalism’s emergence inclined 
common law toward this standard of objectivity, and this transformation 
dramatically rearranged society. The transformation helped to solidify the 
professional standing of American legal practitioners, who self-represented as 
experts in the objective discernment and politically-neutral application of legal 
rules.102 The voice of this self-representation took the form of bar associations, 
which became more prominent around this time first in cities, then states, and 
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101 Id. at 256. 
102 See id. at 256–57. 
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The modern American professional practice of law congealed during legal 
formalism’s rise around the 1870s. It built on an increase in lawyer demand, 
which census material indicated began to grow in 1850.104 The former and loose-
knit apprenticeship system that socialized lawyers into the trade gave way in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century to the reading of law through university law 
schools.105 And it was through the development of rigorous and standardized 
legal education that the trade transformed into a profession—a transformation 
that would also ripple across the landscape of American graduate education as 
universities increasingly came to embrace German pedagogical influences.106  
Part of formalism’s rise is well understood: From 1870 to 1895, Christopher 
Columbus Langdell served as Dean of Harvard Law School. There, he 
systematized American legal education through the study of settled cases.107 He 
applied that practice to contract law and introduced the case method, 108 along 
with the Socratic method, which relied on repetitive questioning to tacitly reveal 
ignorance as a means of motivating student inquiry.109 This methodology 
profoundly influenced the formalist pedagogy of American law. In his 
pathbreaking textbook on contracts, Langdell espoused the revelatory power of 
legal formalism, whereby “[l]aw, considered as a science, consist[ed] of certain 
principles or doctrines” reducible and ascertainable through the case method of 
study.110 To Langdell, the ascertainment of law involved a process of discovery, 
which lent itself to principles of scientific method, no better exemplified than by 
the teachings of Yale Law scholar, Walter Wheeler Cook, who professed the 
application of rational, mathematical principles to the study of law.111  
Formalism presented the thesis of classical orthodoxy and its antithesis 
became known as legal realism.112 Formalism emphasized the role of the judge 
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and the adjudication process as the autonomous means of determining the one 
and only outcome of a case, unadulterated by nonlegal normative considerations 
of law or political philosophy. Formalism emphasized the deductive correctness 
of a decision whereas realism emphasized the sociological soundness of a 
decision.113 American legal realism attacked formalism’s purported acontextual, 
un-sociological and “mechanical” devotion to rationalism. The legal realist 
movement gained prominence in the 1920s and 1930s and included American 
judicial luminaries such as Oliver Wendell Holmes,114 Roscoe Pound,115 
Benjamin Cardozo,116 Eugen Ehrlich,117 and Karl Llewellyn.118 Powerful 
European contributions were made by Axel Hägerström’s Uppsala School 
(which included Karl Olivecrona and Vilhelm Lundstedt) and most significantly, 
Hägerström’s student and chief representative of  Scandinavian legal realism, 
Alf Ross.119 Legal realism responded to the dissonance caused by formalism’s 
derivation of applicable rules, and the dispute continues. Recently, Jean 
d’Aspremont has attempted to refresh support of formalism out of concern that 
the movement to deformalize international law results in greater indeterminacy 
and ambiguity as to the ascertainment of proper law. To guard against the rise 
of quasi-law, his attention has turned to the organic and shared written or 
linguistic indicators found in the practice of international law, for instance, in 
the ritualistic language of Security Council, which fortifies formalistic law 
determination.120 
 
C. THE PROBLEM OF PERIODIZING FORMALISM 
 
In 1974, Yale University law professor Grant Gilmore delivered the 
influential Storrs lecture that produced his book, The Ages of American Law 
(1977), which has been acclaimed as the “most influential modern formulation” 
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114 See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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116 See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); See also 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); See also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE 
PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928). 
117 See generally EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Walter L. 
Moll trans., 1936). 
118 His primary works include Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence–The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. 
REV. 431 (1930); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS 
STUDY (1930); see also Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
DECIDING APPEALS (1960). Other distinguished jurists fitting this mold, according to Richard Posner 
(who doubtless meets this qualitative assessment and subscribes to it as well) include Louis Brandeis, 
Learned Hand, Robert Jackson, Roger Traynor, and Henry Friendly. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL 
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); see POSNER, supra note 61, at 2. 
119 See generally ALF ROSS, TOWARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICISM OF THE DUALISM IN 
LAW (1946); see also ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1959). The latter work, regarded as his most 
important, appeared first in Danish, OM RET OG RETFAERDIGHED, in 1953, and devoted considerable 
attention to “legal politics” and the “applied sociology of law.” Ross also wrote the highly regarded A 
TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947); see also Mauro Zamboni, Alf Ross’s Legal Philosophy, 
A TREATISE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE 401, 402 (E. Pattaro & C. Roversi 
eds., 2016) (for an account of Ross’s intellectual debt to Hägerström while departing from his 
teachings). 
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of legal formalism.121 Gilmore located a judicial turn toward formalism—away 
from the “Grand Style” of judicial flexibility that held sway since the 
Revolution—after the Civil War. “The post-Civil War juridical product” 
construed “law as a closed, logical system” that restricted the judicial function 
to discovering the extent that “true rules . . . are and indeed always have been.”122 
Gilmore’s periodization of the Formalist Age generated criticism. Brian 
Tamanaha called it “dubious.”123 He dated law’s ability to “furnish a rule of 
decision for every case . . . a mere fiction,”124 as early as 1833. Tamanaha also 
implicated Jerome Frank and his important work, Law and the Modern Mind 
(1930) for perpetuating the “[b]asic [l]egal [m]yth” of the completeness of the 
common law,125 and for distorting the view of early twentieth century Harvard 
Law and Chicago Law Dean Joseph Beale by characterizing him “as the leading 
contemporary representative of conceiving of law as composed of unchanging 
principles.”126  
Periodization questions infiltrate the study of history. However, the critique 
of formalism’s reliance on immanence—the internalist dimension of the judicial 
function that deduced applicable legal principles to create a gapless legal 
order—contained inherent conflicts between republican virtue and the spatial 
dynamics of chattel slavery and Indian removal. These two features of the 
hemispheric encounter with colonialism predate Professor Gilmore’s 
periodization of formalism and its rise after the Civil War.  
 
D. FORMALISM’S PARALLEL MOVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SEEDLINGS 
OF CROSS-OVER 
 
When discussing antecedents to formalism’s rise in America, it is important 
to note that a parallel movement arose in public international law and launched 
on the continent around the 1860s and 1870s, partially supporting the Gilmore 
thesis removed to the plane of international legal discourse. As discussed by 
Martti Koskenniemi, an esprit d’internationalité began to solidify around the 
professionalized practice of international law. This spirit arose first through the 
scholarly articles presented in the Revue de Droit International et de Législation 
Comparée, first published in 1868, and then with the founding of the Institut de 
droit international in 1873, by what Koskenniemi referred to as a new breed—
the ‘Men of 1873’. Leaders of this movement—such as the Belgian jurist and 
editor, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns; the holder of the Whewell Chair of 
International Law at Cambridge University, John Westlake; and the Swiss 
historicist, Johann Bluntschli—sought out a more systematic articulation of 
international legal science during this so-called belle époque.127 By this time, 
Frédéric Passy had organized in 1867 the Société des Amis de la Paix (renamed 
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in 1889 the Société française pour l’arbitrage entre nations), which essentially 
launched the international peace movement. Passy’s movement promoted a 
belief in the maturation of international law. It marked an important milestone 
in the rise of internationalism and new-born international organizations. For his 
efforts, Passy would receive the 1901 Nobel Peace Prize.128 
Historian Irwin Abrams wrote of two other “momentous events” in the 
1870s that fortified the development of the internationalist agenda. The first was 
the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), which involved techniques of counter-
insurgency that prompted calls to constrain war. The second was the arbitral 
resolution of a dispute between England and the United States regarding the 
Alabama Claims (1871-1872),129 which reinforced the credibility of third party 
dispute resolution.130 
The rapid expansion of positive law and the professionalization of the legal 
practice warranted retrospective appreciation for the nineteenth century as the 
Golden Age of International Law, a commonplace ascription supported mostly 
by its “constant reiteration,” but not without doctrinal support. International 
legal theorist Nicholas Onuf claimed Lassa Oppenheim, Hersch Lauterpacht, 
J.L. Brierly, and Hans Kelsen figured importantly in the extension of this age 
into the twentieth century, which, given their late nineteenth century intellectual 
upbringing, “had not yet come to a close.”131 Several of these accounts 
emphasized the supreme standing of the state as the unit of analysis in 
international relations. Charles Hyde’s 1922 treaties even went so far as to deny 
that tribal peoples ever held any juridical personality.132 According to Paul 
McHugh, “[t]his absolutist, highly positivistic approach . . . was symptomatic of 
the intellectual climate of the time, where it was believed that law could be 
scientifically identified and applied, and in retrospect of which the sovereignty 
of the territorial state was the notional foundation.”133 
David Kennedy critically attacked formalism’s contribution to the Golden 
Age and the historical illusions it supported: the distinction between public and 
private law; the international and the national; the sovereign and the individual; 
together with the “untroubled practice of deductive legal reasoning.”134 He 
reduced formalism to a set of unwitting contradictions, making its adherents 
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Perhaps no better illustration of the contradictions of this age arises with the 
publication of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1836), the first 
English language treatise devoted to international law. The eighth edition 
appeared in 1866 with Richard Henry Dana serving as editor, and it achieved 
canonical status as the leading international text of its age.136 Its publication on 
the cusp of the Golden Age and its Men of 1873 helped to secure a respected 
North American doctrinal voice among the core of newborn European 
international legal elites. It has been characterized alternatively as a cogent and 
complete explanation for the rise of liberal internationalism and the practical and 
moral addition to international law’s enshrinement of colonialism.137   
Wheaton benefitted from the rational re-working of English common law, 
principally William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (4 vol., 
1765-1769), and from the writings of James Kent, Chancellor of the New York 
State Court of Chancery. In 1826, Kent published the first of the fourteen 
editions of his Commentaries on American Law, which systemized a mature 
American approach to common law based on American precedent in addition to 
English customary law.138 At the same time, Kent praised the “vast superiority” 
of the western Christian tradition for providing the foundation for North 
American strength.139 Kent also devoted two hundred pages to his emerging 
American formulation of international law.140 David Bederman further located 
elements of Wheaton’s dualism in Joseph Story’s publication of Conflicts of 
Laws (1834), which Bederman described as a “crucial moment” in the elevation 
of “a territorial basis for resolving conflicts.”141 “Story’s move to a territorial 
basis for resolving conflicts . . . was critical in establishing a difference between 
private and public international law. Henceforth, territorial sovereigns began to 
regard themselves as unrestrained by international law to decide such matters as 
prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction.”142 
Wheaton’s formulation of international law was not as segmented as Story’s 
public and private spheres. He presented an “admixture of natural and positive 
sources for obligation, of moral restraint and positive consent.143  His empirical 
pragmatism, in part, moved away from the rising tide of Continental formalism 
and “positivist absolutism.”144 He recognized a society of independent nations 
that tethered law and justice to the promotion of the idea of community. 
However, he remained “overwhelming[ly] commit[ted] to states, as the sole 
subjects of international law.”145 What made international law congeal in 
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Wheaton’s legal mind, according to Mark Janis, was the immanent morality of 
Christianity and Western civilization,146 and the  “circle of like-minded States 
bound by common traditions of culture, law and morals.”147 Zhiguang Yin 
claimed Wheaton thought “[b]eing a civilized nation [was] thus the foundation 
for becoming a sovereign nation,” all of which came from the unity of 
Christendom.148 Wheaton’s presentation of an American treatise on international 
law helped to tie together disparate threads of immanent public and private-
sphere rationality as initiated by Kent, Story, and the unfolding of the as yet 
unnamed significance of American frontierism. To Paul McHugh, Wheaton’s 
attachment to the standard of civilization achieved its full presence in Anglo-
American treatises from the second half of the nineteenth century, although the 




III. FORMALISM’S PROTO-PULLS: THE INTERNATIONAL SLAVE TRADE AND 
INDIAN REMOVAL 
 
Another part of formalism’s story involves its early nineteenth-century 
hidden history, which predates its later nineteenth-century influence on 
international law and the men of its Golden Age. Elements of formalism existed 
in an ambivalent American legal psyche before the arrival of German historical 
influences. They arose first in relation to the contradictions between newly 
emergent republican ideals and the “peculiar institution” of slavery,150 and then 
in relation to the rationalized means by which hundreds of treaty commitments 
were abrogated to facilitate the Indian removal campaign east of the Mississippi 
River and south of the Ohio River. Obvious inconsistencies in judicial treatments 
of these issues indicated problems regarding formalism’s early ascertainment. 
They also indicated tensions involving the derivation of guiding natural rights 
principles in an increasingly positivistic and material hemispheric world. 
Legal historian Mark Tushnet expressed slavery’s contradictions in terms of 
dichotomies, never completely reconciled, between the rise of a northern, 
industrial society based on bourgeoise law and its division of labor based on 
market relations, and the sentimental totality of slave law and the social ordering 
on an economic system based on paternalism and entitlement.151 According to 
Tushnet, law’s growing “autonomy,” in the form of “generally shared 
principles,” enforced the power of precedent as applied by “mediocre” judges 
who felt constrained to construct approaches to law that reduced latent social 
contradictions “to manageable proportions.”152 Within common law’s support 
for upholding precedent, a legal structure of formalism began to take shape early 
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in the nineteenth century. Frontier expansion combined with a conflicted, but 
forming, judicial mindset that inclined toward the rational supremacy of the 
republic’s civilizing mission and its immanent entitlement to geospace. This 
entitlement eventually contributed to the breaking of hundreds of treaty 
obligations based on the rationalistic conversion of the sovereign status of 
Native peoples to a condition of mere tenancy. 
 Formalism’s judicial construction also reflected the increasingly important 
material economic concerns of the early nineteenth century. This material 
component of formalism drew from the economics of human bondage and land 
speculation associated with western expansion. It would widen from the ambit 
of judge-made law to all spheres of private law, where it would turn private law 
into an instrument of exchange. Formalism supported pro-entrepreneurial 
revisions to contract, tort, conflicts of law, usury, and negotiability, and became 
the engine for social and legal transformation. It could not but have an effect on 
the construction of hemispheric international law. 
Common law began to “encourage[] disguised forms of judicially 
sanctioned economic redistribution,” which increased inequality yet promoted 
freedom of exchange.153 According to Horwitz, formalism’s informal growth 
from early parts of the nineteenth century created double pulls across private and 
public spheres,154 no more starkly observed than in early nineteenth century 
judicial struggles with the outlawry of the international slave trade, and the 
debate over tribal sovereignty in the United States.155 While importation of 
teachings from German legal science boosted formalism’s appeal in America, 
nascent formalistic rationale established a parallel, preliminary foothold in 
American juridical thought, although its ‘informal’ birth was disguised by 
contradictions that juxtaposed American republican ideals and slavery, followed 
by Indian removal. 
This ambivalence regarding the outlawry of the international slave trade and 
the sovereign status of Native American republics eventually contributed to the 
rise of formalism by the mid-to-late nineteenth century, after which American 
approaches to international law began to reinforce formalism’s hold world-wide. 
Early expressions of formalism’s adherence to immanence and the internal, self-
contained sufficiency of law helped to reconcile stark ironies and contradictions 
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associated with American revolutionary ideals. These rationalizations 
profoundly influenced the development of international law in the Americas and 
its diminishment of place-based sensibility.  
 
A. THE SUPPRESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SLAVE TRADE 
 
The US outlawed the international slave trade on January 1, 1808,156 ending 
a practice that was lawful in this part of the New World for nearly 200 years and 
marking “the first time in history that a slaveholding society voluntarily ceased 
to import new slaves.”157 Legal historian Paul Finkelman described this 
termination of the African trade as “the most successful antislavery action of the 
founding generation at the national level,” and yet it contrasted sharply with the 
institution itself, which remained legal in the US and elsewhere in the New 
World, and “with the proslavery legislation providing for the return of fugitive 
slaves” and the failure to end slavery in the Northwest Territory following 
adoption of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787.158 It also contrasted with the 
imagery of Thomas Jefferson’s ‘Empire of Liberty’,159 set against Jefferson’s 
personal and lifelong desire to avoid the problem of slavery in light of his 
“profound negrophobia.”160 And it personally bedeviled slaveholding defenders 
of American republican virtue, as reflected in a litany of slave cases that reached 
the Marshall and Taney Supreme Courts between 1801 to 1864, “not one 
decided in support of a freedom suit.”161 Even the revered Justice Joseph 
Story,162 who never owned a slave (Marshall, however, owned hundreds during 
his life163), and at times professed open hostility toward the institution, wrote the 
opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842),164 that “made every black in the North, 
even if born free, vulnerable to being seized as a fugitive slave without any due-
process hearing.”165 Finkelman claimed that this decision “was as proslavery as 
anything Chief Justice Taney would conjure up in the Dred Scott case [1857],” 
which held that all people of African descent, free or slave, were not US citizens 
and that slaves were the legal property of their owner.166 A formalistic obedience 
to the Constitution, which embedded pro-slavery provisions such as the three-
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fifths clause,167 the Electoral College,168 the slave-trade clause,169 the fugitive 
slave clause,170 the South’s veto power over amending these provisions,171 
helped to account for Story’s problematic treatment of this subject, and 
eventually his silence on Marshall’s bench on bondage cases argued before the 
Supreme Court. 
In 1819, Congress granted the President the authority to return captives 
illegally brought to the US to Africa,172 in part due to the Abolitionist movement 
and in part due to the American Colonization Society’s campaign to return 
illegally imported Africans to places such as Liberia.173 A latent tension 
separated the interests of these two movements, as the intentions of the 
American Colonization Society also could be construed as an act of removal, not 
of the institution of slavery itself, but rather of free blacks back to Africa. Francis 
Scott Key, who penned the poem that would become the lyrics to the nation’s 
national anthem (The Star-Spangled Banner),174 helped to establish the society 
and supported this solution, which ultimately returned about 13,000 Africans to 
Africa’s West Coast. Though Key’s poem memorialized the “land of the free,”” 
he owned slaves and conceived of removing free African descendants as the only 
pragmatic (half) solution to an intractable problem.175  
Furthermore, interpretation of the Slave Trade Act produced questions and 
substantially different conclusions regarding interdiction of foreign slave 
vessels. A number of these cases reached the Supreme Court, mostly on 
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technical issues of when a voyage began or questions of proof necessary to 
convict the trader.176 The irony of the Supreme Court’s slave-holding justices 
presiding over the disposition of such human cargo also did not go unnoticed,177 
but could be reconciled, at least in part, in terms sanctioning the appeal of 
formalism, which justified material agrarian interests associated with land 
management. 
Interesting juxtapositions in terms of juridical treatment arose, however, 
particularly involving the interdiction of human cargo at sea. In the case of the 
United States v. Schooner Amistad of 1841, the Supreme Court recognized that 
native-born Africans afloat a Spanish vessel found in U.S. waters off the coast 
of Long Island, New York, had been kidnapped and enslaved in violation of the 
laws of Spain.178 The Africans had taken control of the ship and had killed its 
captain and cook. The mutineers were set free, in large part due to the advocacy 
of former President John Quincy Adams before the Supreme Court. Adams’ 
eight-and-one-half hour argument referenced, but eschewed, an appeal to 
external natural law, noting no other applicable law, statute, constitution, code, 
or treaty “applicable to the proceedings except that law” deriving from within 
the ethos of America’s Declaration of Independence.179 Similarly, in the United 
States v. La Jeune Eugenie of 1822, Justice Story, riding circuit in 
Massachusetts, upheld as valid the search and seizure of a French slave vessel 
disguised as a trader in palm oil.180 He wrote that the slave trade aggregated 
“accumulated wrongs” that could hardly be consistent with the law of nations.181 
Story assessed the foreign slave trade’s legal status in federal courts according 
to a unitary connection between domestic and international law, presenting a 
rationally deducible natural law outcome that nevertheless implicitly recognized 
the sensitive political nature of the judgment when he allowed the slave vessel 
to be returned to the French rather than condemned and sold to support 
prohibition of the practice. In The Antelope of 1825,182 however, Chief Justice 
Marshall foreshadowed a more materialist construction of formalism and its rise 
by drawing a “sharp contrast between the jurist and the moralist.”183 Story 
silently concurred in what Finkelman described as Marshall’s “dressing down 
[of] his closest colleague on the Court for arguing [in La Jeune Eugenie] that the 
trade violated” natural law and the law of nations.184 
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The Antelope had set sail under American flag from Baltimore in 1819, 
however it switched flags at sea after it was captured by pirates. It then 
proceeded to plunder ships off the coast of West Africa, accruing slaves along 
the way. It later commingled and consolidated human cargo claimed by Spain 
and Portugal, was intercepted by a U.S. revenue cutter, and taken to the port of 
Savannah, where a three-way dispute arose among Portugal, Spain, and the U.S. 
over the custody of the Africans. Chief Justice Marshall noted how “abhorrent” 
the slave trade was, even opining “[t]hat it is contrary to the law of nature . . . . 
[because] every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor.”185 Yet he 
recognized “it has been sanctioned . . . by the laws of nations  . . .  [as a] common 
commercial business . . . . from long usage, and general acquiescence . . . ,”186 
and also as a right of conquest established by the customs and usages of war.187 
Although he denounced slavery and the international slave trade “as violative of 
natural rights, natural law, and Christian morality,”188 he cautioned that the 
“Court must not yield to feelings which might seduce it from the path of duty, 
and must obey the mandate of the law.”189 Marshall wrote: “Whatever might be 
the answer of a moralist to this question [regarding the legality of the slave 
trade], a jurist must search for its legal solution . . . [and make] resort to this 
standard as the test of international law.”190 Marshall treated the 258 Africans 
aboard the ship as commercial property, and a rough, pro-rated formula 
eventually divided the lot of Africans. The Court determined that the captives 
claimed by non-U.S. nations were slaves. Africans placed in the custody of the 
U.S. were returned to Africa; others sold to American slave owners with 
proceeds remitted to the Spanish and Portuguese to cover their losses.191 
Importantly, Story’s approach in La Jeune Eugenie seemed to keep one eye 
squarely on the nation’s relations with an important ally, France, whereas 
Marshall’s approach in The Antelope ascertained the appropriate legal principle 
with one eye squarely on not upsetting Southern slave-holding sensibilities. A 
formative movement toward a formalistic, place-based rulemaking was in the 
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B. INDIAN REMOVAL 
 
The campaign against Natives, stimulated in part by the 1829 discovery of 
gold in Cherokee country (Georgia),192 resulted in the Indian Removal Act 
(1830), which displaced Natives of the five autonomous Gulf and southern 
republics—the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee, and the last to resist, the 
Seminole—to land west of the Mississippi River.193 During this period, 
according to historian Angie Debo, the “age of military conquest was succeeded 
by the age of economic absorption, when the long rifle of the frontiersman was 
displaced by the legislative enactment and court decree of the legal exploiter, 
and the lease, mortgage, and deed of the land shark.”194 
Indian removal provided another portal through which formalism would 
enter into hemispheric international law. Although the process would congeal 
toward the end of the nineteenth century, the removal campaign between 1814–
1858 spread Trails of Tears across the closing of the American frontier while 
massively redistributing Native homelands.195 In one fourteen-year period 
beginning in 1850, “nearly the entire west coast of the United States transferred 
from Indian to American hands.”196 
A shading of this formalism appeared in the seventeenth century when 
England’s Charles II rescinded in 1680 his Carolinas land grant of 1629 and 
converted it into in a proprietary land charter to stimulate migratory land 
speculators and generate profit.197 The King’s Bench already had established the 
common law principle of jus soli in Calvin’s Case of 1608, which laid the ground 
for assigning title to land based on birthright citizenship, which then extended 
property rights to the postnati.198 Robert Williams claimed this case established 
the presumption of English superior rights over the Natives’ America.199 It set 
off a long string of metropolitan engagements and conflicting possessory 
entitlements based on discovery and conquest that increasingly involved and 
diminished aboriginal space. Part of this reasoning rested on the diminished 
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capacity of Natives (perpetui inimici) to engage in relations with Christians, and 
part of the reasoning asserted that Natives occupied domain as tenants at will, 
never having settled, encumbered, cleared, or improved their land.200 
There is double irony here. Native peoples of North America, bearers of the 
originary claim of jus soli, were subjected to its imperfect application by the 
European imaginary, even after the Cherokee “were one of the first tribal groups 
to acquire U.S. citizenship.”201 Moreover, many Native peoples, particularly the 
Eastern Cherokee, converted toward agrarianism during the Monroe presidency. 
The Cherokee accepted missionary schools; developed their own alphabet in 
1821, a remarkable syllabary designed by Sequoyah;202 openly adapted 
European conventions and dress; converted matrilineal clan-based decision-
making into representative councils and constitutional government; established 
newspapers, a diplomatic corps, and even developed forced labor plantations.203 
These efforts earned them a measure of acceptance as a Civilized Tribe until 
material interests in frontier land accumulation and expansion necessitated the 
application of the jus soli principle to bring about their removal.    
 In 1831, the state of Georgia pressed its claim of superior rights when its 
land surveyors entered Cherokee territory. The Cherokee then brought suit 
before the Supreme Court, where Chief Justice Marshall denied them relief 
because the suit was improperly brought as that of a foreign nation, when, at 
best, the Natives’ status was that of “a domestic, dependent nation . . . in a state 
of pupilage.” 204 The Treaty of Paris (1763) had ended the French and Indian 
War, settling metropolitan territorial disputes in favor of British rule over the 
northern Ohio Valley, territory east of the Mississippi River, and Spanish 
Florida. It did not, however, settle the question of expanding colonial interests 
over the southeastern territory, fomented by the mythos of American 
expansionism. According to historian Grandin, “[t]here was not one problem 
caused by expansion that couldn’t be solved by more expansion.”205 The idea of 
perfecting territorial acquisition through legal ritualism took shape. From 1774 
until about 1832, treaties became the method for establishing land holdings, 
entitlements, and borders between individual sovereign American Nations and 
the U.S. government.206 Between 1778 and 1833, special Indian commissioners 
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acting for the President under the supervision of the Secretary of War negotiated 
and concluded 374 treaties with indigenous peoples.207  
  However, underpinning this burgeoning reference to parchment was the 
immanent construct of interpretation provided by new rules associated with 
conquest and land conversion. In 1823, Chief Justice Marshall imparted legal 
significance to the discovery doctrine in the landmark Supreme Court case, 
Johnson v. M’Intosh.208 Marshall ruled that the Piankeshaw and Illinois Natives 
had no capacity to sell their land to private Eastern land speculators in part 
because they never owned it. They were “fierce savages . . . whose subsistence 
was drawn chiefly from the forest,” and because, in Lockean terms, they did not 
“improve the land” but “[left] the country a wilderness.”209 Marshall rationalized 
that Natives “could not be governed as a distinct society.”210 Land appropriation 
“in the immediate neighbourhood of agriculturalists became unfit for them. . . . 
[Settlers] parcelled out and [took] possession of [the soil]; and the Natives fled, 
chasing game.211 Marshall reasoned that the law regulating conquest applied to 
a static, not ambulatory, almost nomadic notion of what it meant to be 
conquered. That nomadic construction “was incapable of application.”212 He 
held the “unavoidable” need to “resort to some new and different rule, better 
adapted to the actual state of things.”213 The Court ruled that Natives had no fee 
title to convey as they essentially only secured an “occupancy” interest in their 
land and thus held no real property interest to convey. Marshall reasoned that 
they lost the right of alienability as a legal consequence of discovery by 
colonizing European sovereigns. This right subsequently passed by conquest or 
purchase from the English Crown to the rightful holders of American land 
titles.214 Marshall’s formalistic reasoning asserted the fundamental rule 
deducible from conquest and the Law of Nations: “However extravagant the 
pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest 
may appear, if the principle had been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards 
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the 
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and 
cannot be questioned.”215 
The rationale for the dependency doctrine had been laid out in an 1822 
Indian Commission report by Jedidiah Morse to the Madison Administration.216 
The European settlers’ right to appropriate aboriginal land was based on the 
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latter’s “qualified” occupancy of the land that provided “no power to convey” 
or own. The report held that “[t]he right of soil, or the absolute property, 
belong[ed] to the Sovereign, or State under whose authority the discovery and 
settlement were made.”217 The right of soil subsequently passed and “vested in 
the states of this Union.”218 
The ruling in M’Intosh contrasted with Marshall’s rationale in Worcester v. 
Georgia (1832),219 indicating the early ambivalence associated with formalism. 
In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the state of Georgia could not impose 
licensing laws on white Christian missionaries residing in Cherokee territory in 
Georgia. The state had attempted through this licensing law to stop sympathizers 
from associating with the Cherokee Nation, which the Court ruled violated the 
Constitutional provision that granted to Congress the authority to regulate 
commerce with Natives.220 Citing the Swiss authority on the Law of Nations, 
Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767), Marshall noted that “Tributary and feudatory 
states . . . do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states” simply 
by associating with a stronger power.221 “[T]he Indian nations had always been 
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 
original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil.”222 The tensions 
and contradictions were apparent early in the nineteenth century. However, 
formalism’s pull in support of material interests involving land management, 
expansionism, public and private distinctions, and the maturation of an 
American legal profession based on private contract, matched with a maturing 
international legal consciousness that imparted immanent authority to emerging 
liberalism, took hold after the Civil War, spreading its dominant construction of 




IV. CONCLUSION: SPATIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TODAY 
 
Discussion about indigenous peoples as a “global concept” only gained 
prominence in the 1970s.223 Even then, scholars debated the substantive 
sufficiency of the term. Some scholars deemed it an “unworkable and 
dangerously incoherent” normative construct.224 Others resisted the separation 
of minority rights from indigenous rights.225 Skepticism abated with the 
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) definition in 1989, which connected 
tribal peoples to “social, cultural and economic conditions,” as distinguished 
from other sectors of the national community, “on account of their descent from 
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the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region . . . the 
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state 
boundaries.”226    
The ILO definition tethered indigenous peoples to considerations of time, 
place, and conquest. A history of subordination has turned indigenous rights into 
a world-wide resistance movement—a movement characterized by contested 
claims to spatial domain. This resistance movement may currently focus 
attention on peoples such as the Dongria Kondh and their struggles against 
transglobal capitalism’s encroachment into their sacred mountain domain; 
however, historically, it naturally focuses attention on the Americas, where the 
first “full impact” of modern European expansion began.227 
A fuller consideration of indigenous rights—as something other than a 
resistance movement—has yet to occupy a central place in the progressive 
development of international law. The argument here is that early American 
contradictions between the republican virtues on which independence was 
founded conflicted with the institution of slavery and the mythos of frontier 
expansion, which facilitated the abrogation of treaties, land grabs, and Indian 
removal. Inconsistencies in important case law germinating from the prohibition 
of the international slave trade, together with the internalization of the jus soli 
principle to establish European birthright to land in the New World, oriented 
early American encounters with international law toward a problematic and still 
forming sense of immanence. This immanence vacillated between natural law 
and natural rights methods of ascertaining applicable principles, with 
rationalized European-descendant title accrued by means of conquest, land 
domination, and Christianity’s civilizing mission. 
The prohibition of the international slave trade accommodated a foreign 
policy sensibility that promoted an international presence for the new country, 
but not at the expense of upsetting a complicated balance of power among 
seafaring nations, which did not include the United States. At the same time, a 
confusing if not irreconcilable recognition of regional slave practices in the 
South, which was at the core of the southern region’s economy, had to be 
accommodated in view of the outlawry of international slave trading, even as 
imperfectly practiced along the Atlantic hemispheric seaboard. Internal 
rationalizations produced formalistic legal principles that supported spatial 
constructs and pro-slavery provisions of the Constitution while imperfectly 
chipping away at the international slave trade. 
With regard to Indian removal, the juridical mindset of immanence, reliant 
on German historicist influences of space and place—concepts also reflected in 
Lockean and Kantian (and later Schmittian) notions of land conversion and 
improvement—contrasted with presumptions of mere Native tenancy interests 
over their spatial domain, a tenancy interest exemplified by their unimproved 
stewardship and nomadic, non-agrarian or fenced-in relationship to place. These 
presumptions, however untrue, fed into a mythos of civilization and 
expansionism that generated the basis for vesting land title in European and 
American frontier understandings of sovereignty.  
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 The struggle over the meaning of legal formalism began much earlier than 
its usually fully-formed periodization as a post-Civil War movement. However, 
the expression of mature formalism supported the rational ascertainment of 
principles that turned common law into an instrument of material development 
and dominium. As the common law developed over the long nineteenth century, 
the reaffirmations of immanence gained support from the professionalization of 
legal practice and pedagogy, which witnessed during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century a parallel development of an international legal mindset as a 
mature, stand-alone discipline.  
Writers of the Golden Age of international law fortified the independent 
status of international law and portaged its positivistic formality into the 
twentieth century. However, this incorporation also drew from Wheaton’s 
admixture of pragmatic American common law, which itself projected a 
community ideal consistent with Christian and state-centric influences.  
International law’s difficult encounter with human geography helps to 
explain the impediments to the fuller expression of human rights and indigenous 
rights and why these projects will remain resistance movements until 
international law broadens its notion of place and takes more seriously 
spatiality’s effect on the construction of international law.   
 
